Blog / Tech, New & Old /
The SolarWinds hack explained
The SolarWinds hack is the textbook example of a supply-chain attack: instead of breaking into thousands of organisations one by one, attackers broke into one software company and let that company’s own update deliver the damage.
It was discovered in December 2020, and the lessons still apply to anyone who installs plugins, extensions or updates, which is all of us.
The short version
SolarWinds is a company that makes network-monitoring software. Its best-known product, Orion, is used by large organisations to keep an eye on their IT systems. Because it needs wide access, it runs with a lot of trust.
Attackers got into SolarWinds’ build process and inserted malicious code into legitimate Orion updates. Customers installed those updates the normal way. The updates were genuine and digitally signed, because the poison was added before the signing step.
The analogy: the poisoned parcel
Imagine you trust a particular courier completely. Nobody checks their parcels, because they’re always on time and always sealed. Now say a criminal gets into the courier’s sorting office and slips something nasty into some parcels before they’re sealed with the company’s label.
Every recipient sees a trusted label on a trusted parcel. The trust is what the attack used. That’s essentially what happened.
How it unfolded
- Attackers got in. Reports said they had access to SolarWinds’ systems for a long period before anyone noticed.
- They altered the build. A backdoor, later named Sunburst, was added to Orion updates sent out in the first half of 2020.
- Customers installed the update. Around 18,000 organisations received the compromised version, SolarWinds said.
- The attackers chose targets. Most of those installations were left alone. The attackers picked a smaller set of high-value victims for further access, including government bodies and technology companies.
- Discovery. The security firm FireEye (now part of Mandiant) found it after noticing its own systems had been breached, and announced it in December 2020.
The US government later attributed the operation to Russia’s foreign intelligence service, the SVR, which Russia denied.
Why it was so hard to spot
- The software was legitimate and signed. Normal checks said everything was fine.
- The backdoor waited. Reports said it stayed quiet for a period before doing anything, and it blended its traffic with normal activity.
- It was targeted. Rather than making noise, it chose carefully.
- Orion already had wide access. Monitoring tools need to see everything, which makes them a perfect hiding place.
What it changed
The attack made “supply chain security” a boardroom topic. In the following years, organisations paid far more attention to:
- Where software comes from, and what’s inside it.
- Software bills of materials, lists of the components inside a product.
- Build-process security, so the code that gets signed is the code that was written.
- Least privilege, giving tools only the access they truly need.
Why a normal person or small site owner should care
You may think this is a story about governments and big companies. The mechanism is much more general. You trust updates from software you install, and attackers know that.
If you run a WordPress site, you’re in a supply chain. Your plugins, themes and their updates are code written by people you’ve never met. A plugin that gets sold to a new owner, or whose developer account is compromised, can push a bad update to every site that uses it. This has happened in the WordPress world several times. Browser extensions that are a security risk covers the same pattern in your browser.
That doesn’t mean you should stop updating. Updates mostly fix real vulnerabilities. It means being deliberate.
What you can do
- Install fewer things. Every plugin, extension or app is a trust decision. Remove what you don’t use. I walk through the process in auditing your WordPress plugins before they slow you down.
- Prefer reputable sources with active maintenance, a clear owner and recent updates.
- Keep backups you can restore, so a bad update isn’t the end of the world. See WordPress backups: a setup that saves you on the worst day.
- Update on a schedule, with a backup first, rather than in a panic or never.
- Limit access. Give each account and tool only the permissions it needs.
- Use two-factor authentication on every account that can publish or change code.
- Watch for ownership changes. If a trusted plugin suddenly changes hands or behaviour, pay attention.
Common myths
- “Only big organisations were affected.” Many were, but the technique works at every size.
- “Signed software is safe.” A signature proves who released it, not that the code is good.
- “The fix is to stop updating.” No: unpatched software has its own well-known risks.
A quick self-check for your own setup
You don’t need a security team to apply the lesson. Set aside twenty minutes and ask yourself these questions about any site or computer you look after:
- Which tools can change my site or files? Plugins, themes, extensions, deployment tools, backup services. List them.
- Which of them update automatically, and which do I update by hand? Automatic updates are convenient, but they mean you’re trusting the vendor every time.
- Who can publish an update? For a plugin, that’s the developer’s account. Is the project still maintained by the people who built it?
- What would I do if one of them turned bad tomorrow? Do I have a recent backup, and do I know how to roll back?
- Which of them have more access than they need? A tool that only sends email shouldn’t be able to edit your whole site.
Nothing here is exotic. It’s the same attention a large organisation should have paid to its monitoring software, scaled down to a person.
Key takeaways
- Attackers hid malicious code in genuine, signed updates to SolarWinds’ Orion software.
- About 18,000 customers got the update, and the attackers selected a smaller number to exploit.
- The incident was found in December 2020 and later attributed by the US government to Russia’s SVR.
- The same trust problem exists in plugins, themes and extensions.
- Fewer installs, reputable sources, backups, scheduled updates and limited access are the practical defences.
Related reading
- Quantum computing explained simply
- The tech jargon of 2025, explained
- Quantum computing explained without the hype
How many plugins or extensions are you trusting right now that you haven’t looked at in the last year?