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What Kodak can teach about disruption

The popular story goes like this: Kodak was a giant, digital cameras came along, Kodak didn’t see it coming, and it went bankrupt. It’s a neat lesson, and it’s wrong in a way that matters.

Kodak saw digital coming. A Kodak engineer, Steve Sasson, built one of the first digital cameras in 1975. The company knew. What it struggled with was what to do about it. And that, I think, is the lesson worth learning: companies rarely fail because they cannot see the future. They fail because the future threatens the thing that pays the bills.

What happened, briefly

For most of the twentieth century, Kodak dominated photography. Its real money didn’t come from selling cameras. It came from film, chemicals and paper: every photo taken meant more sales. It’s the “razor and blades” model, with the film as the blades.

Digital photography broke that model. A digital camera needs no film. If people take pictures on a memory card and look at them on a screen, nobody buys film or prints.

Kodak did invest in digital. It sold digital cameras, it owned important patents, and it ran photo-sharing services. But it kept trying to protect its film business at the same time. In January 2012, it filed for bankruptcy protection in the United States, and it later emerged as a much smaller company.

Why knowing wasn’t enough

1. The old product was too profitable. Film margins were high. Digital ones were lower, and anything that sped up digital would eat into film. Every manager had a rational reason to go slowly.

2. It defined itself by the wrong thing. Kodak thought of itself as a film company. A more useful self-image would have been a company that helped people keep memories. Under that view, film was one method, not the point.

3. The value moved. In the digital world, the cameras mattered less. What mattered was sharing: phones, social networks, apps. Instagram, launched in 2010 and bought by Facebook in 2012, had a team of a few people. The place where photos lived and spread had moved to a different layer entirely, and Kodak had no strong position there.

4. Phone cameras made the camera a feature. When the best camera is the one in your pocket, a standalone point-and-shoot loses its reason to exist for most people.

The strongest counter-argument

Here’s the fair objection: “You can’t judge Kodak so easily. Even if it had gone all-in on digital early, the economics of digital cameras were poor, and it would probably have faced the same pressure. Maybe nobody could have saved a company built around film.”

I think that’s partly true. Some of the squeeze was unavoidable. Film was going to shrink whatever Kodak did. But “unavoidable decline” and “unmanaged decline” are different. A company can shrink and still land on its feet in a new business, as some others have. The point isn’t that Kodak should have won digital cameras. It’s that its choices were driven more by protecting existing revenue than by asking where its customers’ needs were heading.

What this means if you run a website or small business

You may not run a global company, but the same pattern shows up everywhere.

  • Your cash cow may be the thing at risk. If most of your traffic comes from one source, such as one search feature or one social network, a change there can reduce your revenue overnight. Search has changed a lot, and anyone who relied on a single type of query learned to diversify. I wrote about the bigger picture in why Google search changed so much.
  • Define yourself by the job, not the format. A shop that sells phone accessories isn’t in the “cases” business. It is in the business of helping people look after their phones. That description opens more doors.
  • Cannibalise yourself on purpose, in small tests. If you can see a new way of serving customers, try it on a small scale before somebody else does it to you.
  • Watch where attention is moving. Kodak’s problem was not the camera. It was that sharing and storing photos moved to phones and apps. Ask where your audience’s attention is going, not just what your product is.
  • Don’t confuse waiting with safety. The comfortable option often feels responsible right up until it isn’t.

I’m careful with one word here. “Disruption” is used loosely, and plenty of businesses that are “being disrupted” are actually just competing badly. Real disruption is when something cheaper or simpler, which looks inferior at first, improves until it serves the main market. Digital cameras were poor at first. Then they weren’t.

A small, hypothetical example. Say you run a shop that sells printed photo gifts, and most of your orders come from one social network. Phone cameras get better, people stop printing, and the network changes how it shows posts. Nothing dramatic happens in a single week. Orders just get a little thinner each month, and every individual explanation sounds reasonable. That quiet slide, with a reason for every step, is how this kind of decline usually looks from the inside.

Questions to ask yourself

  1. What part of my business makes the most money, and what would make it less valuable?
  2. If a newcomer started today with no history, how would they serve my customers?
  3. What am I protecting because it’s profitable, rather than because it’s still right?
  4. Where are my customers going when they leave?

Key takeaways

  • Kodak invented the digital camera and still struggled, because digital threatened its main source of profit.
  • The value in photography moved from cameras to sharing and phones.
  • Decline may be partly unavoidable, but how a business responds is not.
  • Define your business by the customer’s need, test new models early and diversify your sources of traffic.

Which part of your own work would you hate to cannibalise, and is that the part to look at first?