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WannaCry: the ransomware that hit hospitals
On Friday 12 May 2017, computers around the world began showing a red screen: your files are encrypted, pay in bitcoin to get them back. It was called WannaCry, and within hours it had reached hospitals, companies and public bodies in dozens of countries.
It’s one of the clearest case studies of why updates and backups matter, and it’s a useful story if you want to understand ransomware without the jargon.
What it was
WannaCry was ransomware: malware that locks your files and demands payment to unlock them. What made it different is that it was also a worm: it spread by itself from computer to computer, without anybody opening a dodgy email attachment.
I explained the general idea in ransomware explained for home users.
How it spread
WannaCry used a flaw in an old part of Windows that handled file sharing on networks. The flaw was widely referred to by the name “EternalBlue”, an attack tool believed to have been developed by the US National Security Agency and then leaked by a group calling itself the Shadow Brokers.
The key detail is the timing. Microsoft had already released a fix in March 2017, two months before the outbreak. Computers that had installed the update were protected. The ones that hadn’t, or that ran Windows versions no longer supported, were open.
Once inside a network, WannaCry scanned for other computers with the same flaw and jumped across. A single unpatched machine could infect a whole building.
Why hospitals were hit so hard
The UK’s National Health Service became the best-known victim. Some hospitals had to cancel appointments and divert emergency patients while systems were down. Reasons often cited:
- Old software. Some machines ran outdated Windows, including medical devices that couldn’t easily be updated.
- Busy networks. Hospitals connect many systems, so one infection spreads widely.
- Updating is hard. You can’t just restart a machine in the middle of treating patients, and changes need testing.
- Cost and priorities. Budgets rarely put “patch the old systems” first, until something like this happens.
A large investigation by the UK’s National Audit Office later pointed out that the NHS could have done more to protect itself. The point isn’t to blame hospital staff; it’s that security depends on boring maintenance that nobody gets thanked for.
The kill switch
Within a day, a security researcher, Marcus Hutchins, noticed that the malware tried to contact a particular, unregistered web address before running. By registering that address, he accidentally halted the spread of the first version. It acted like a kill switch. That slowed the outbreak, though it didn’t repair machines already infected, and other variants followed.
It’s a nice reminder that sometimes the defence comes from curiosity and a few pounds of domain registration.
How big was it
Reports at the time said it hit hundreds of thousands of computers in well over 100 countries within days. Exact numbers differ by source. The ransom demand was a few hundred dollars in bitcoin per machine, and relatively little money was actually paid compared with the disruption caused. Governments, including the US and UK, later attributed it to North Korea.
What it taught everyone
- Install security updates. The fix existed and wasn’t applied. This is the headline lesson.
- Retire unsupported software. Old systems that no longer get patches are open doors. This is worth remembering this month, since Windows 10 just lost free support; see Windows 10 support ends today: your options.
- Segment your networks. If one machine is infected, it shouldn’t reach everything else.
- Keep offline backups. The only real answer to ransomware is being able to restore without paying.
- Plan for the bad day. Know in advance who decides what to do and how you’d operate without computers.
What it means for a small business or site owner
WannaCry targeted office networks, not websites. But ransomware is a threat to anyone with files they can’t afford to lose, and the defences are the same, scaled down:
- Backups that ransomware can’t reach. A backup in a folder on the same computer gets encrypted too. Keep copies in a separate place that your computer can’t overwrite. WordPress backups: a setup that saves you on the worst day describes a setup I like.
- Updates on a schedule. I covered why in Patch Tuesday and why updates come in waves.
- Don’t open surprise attachments, and be careful with links. Not WannaCry’s method, but the main route for most ransomware.
- Limit what each account can touch. An admin login used for browsing is a bigger target.
- Test a restore once in a while. A backup you’ve never restored is a hope.
Should you ever pay?
Authorities generally advise against it. Paying doesn’t guarantee your files come back, and it funds the attackers. With WannaCry, in fact, there was no reliable way for the attackers to link payments to specific victims. Good backups make the question disappear.
Common myths
- “Only big organisations get hit.” WannaCry hit everyone with a vulnerable machine.
- “Antivirus alone will protect me.” It helps, but updates and backups matter more.
- “It’s all over now.” Variants of this threat still exist; the same habits protect against them.
Key takeaways
- WannaCry spread in May 2017 using a flaw that Microsoft had fixed two months before.
- It hit unpatched and unsupported systems, including parts of the UK’s NHS.
- A researcher slowed it by registering a domain the malware checked.
- The defences are old and dull: updates, retiring unsupported systems, segmentation and offline backups.
Related reading
Do you have a backup that a ransomware attack couldn’t touch? If not, that’s this week’s job.